istent with natural right. Yet he is not owned as
property. A condemned criminal is "held to labor"--yet he is not owned
as property. The law allows no such straining of the meaning of words
towards the wrong, as that which would convert the words "service or
labor" (of men) into _property in man_--and thus make a man, who serves
or labors for another, the property of that other.

5. "No person held to service or labor, in one state, under the _laws_
thereof."

The "_laws_," here mentioned, and impliedly sanctioned, are, of course,
only _constitutional_ laws--laws, that are consistent, both with the
constitution of the state, and the constitution of the United States.
None others are "_laws_," correctly speaking, however they may attempt
to "hold persons to service or labor," or however they may have the
forms of laws on the statute books.

This word "laws," therefore, being a material word, leaves the whole
question just where it found it--for it certainly does not, _of
itself_--nor indeed does any other part of the clause--say that acts of
a legislature, declaring one man to be the property of another, is a
"_law_" within the meaning of the constitution. As far as the word
"_laws_" says any thing on the subject, it says that such acts are _not_
laws--for such acts are clearly inconsistent with natural law--and it
yet remains to be shown that they are consistent with any constitution
whatever, state or national.

The burden of proof, then, still rests upon the advocates of slavery, to
show that an act of a state legislature, declaring one man to be the
property of another, is a "law," within the meaning of this clause. To
assert simply that it is, without proving it to be so, is a mere begging
of the question--for that is the very point in dispute.

The question, therefore, of the _constitutionality_ of the slave acts
must first be determined, before it can be decided that they are "laws"
within the meaning of the constitution. That is, they must be shown to
be consistent with the constitution, before they can be said to be
sanctioned as "laws" by the constitution. Can any proposition be plainer
than this? And yet the reverse must be assumed, in this case, by the
advocates of slavery.

The simple fact, that an act purports to "hold persons to service or
labor," clearly cannot, _of itself_, make the act constitutional. If it
could, any act, purporting to hold "persons to service or labor," would
necessarily be co