he only ones I have found in all the eleven
constitutions, where any class of persons are designated by the term
"free." And it will be seen hereafter, from the connexion and manner in
which the word is used, in these four cases, that it implies no
recognition of slavery.
Several of the constitutions, to wit, those of Georgia, South Carolina,
North Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New-York--but not
Virginia, New-Jersey, Massachusetts or New-Hampshire--repeatedly use the
word "freeman" or "freemen," when describing the electors, or other
members of the state.
The only questions that can arise from the use of these words "free" and
"freeman," are these, viz: Are they used as the correlatives, or
opposites of slaves? Or are they used in that political sense, in which
they are used in the common law of England, and in which they had been
used in the colonial charters, viz., to describe those persons possessed
of the privilege of citizenship, or some corporate franchise, as
distinguished from aliens, and those not enjoying franchises, although
free from personal slavery?
If it be answered, that they are used in the sense first mentioned, to
wit, as the correlatives or opposites of slavery--then it would be
argued that they involved a recognition, at least, of the existence of
slavery.
But this argument--whatever it might be worth to support an implied
admission of the _actual_ existence of slavery--would be entirely
insufficient to support an implied admission either of its _legal_, or
its _continued_ existence. Slavery is so entirely contrary to natural
right; so entirely destitute of authority from natural law; so palpably
inconsistent with all the legitimate objects of government, that nothing
but express and explicit provision can be recognized, in law, as giving
it any sanction. No hints, insinuations, or unnecessary implications can
give any ground for so glaring a departure from, and violation of all
the other, the general, and the legitimate principles of the government.
If, then, it were admitted that the words "free" and "freemen" were used
as the correlatives of slaves, still, of themselves, the words would
give no direct or sufficient authority for laws establishing or
continuing slavery. To call one man free, gives no legal authority for
making another man a slave. And if, as in the case of these
constitutions, no express authority for slavery were given, slavery
would be as much unconstituti
|