ior blast of cannon fire. Though it
involved the sacrifice of many miles of territory, it was now the
Russian object to draw the enemy's line out to the fullest extent.
After the retreat from the Wistok the Russian Generalissimo, Grand
Duke Nicholas, was concerned only to save the most for his country
at the greatest expense to her enemies. It meant continual retreat
on a gigantic scale. Przemysl, captured ten weeks ago, lay behind
Ivanoff's line, and Lemberg was but sixty miles beyond. Two hundred
miles northward the Germans were hammering at the gates of Warsaw.
A retreat such as the grand duke contemplated might involve the loss
of all three of these places, but it would stretch the Germanic
lines enormously and enable the Allies in the west to strike with
better effect. No territorial considerations must stand in the way
against the safety of the Russian armies. It was the same policy
that had crippled Napoleon in 1812.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXI

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND THE BUKOWINA

In order to keep the narrative abreast of the steadily advancing
Austro-German line, we must change occasionally from one sector to
another to watch the progress of operations over the huge battle
field. In accordance with the details laid down in the great strategic
plan, each of the different Germanic forces had a distinct task to
perform. Turning then to eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, we find
that on May 1, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies were
facing each other along almost the same front where we left them
in the middle of March. That front extended to the north of Nadvorna
and Kolomea, by Ottynia across to Niczviska on the Dniester, and
from there eastward along the river toward Chotin on the Russian
frontier of Bessarabia.

By the beginning of May, 1915, the spring floods had subsided,
when operations became again possible. General Lechitsky, on the
Russian side, probably aimed at recovering the Pruth Valley, while
the Austrian commander, General von Pflanzer-Baltin, directed his
efforts to establishing himself on the northern bank of the Dniester.
He would then be able to advance in line with the Germanic front that
was pressing on from the west, and northward from the Carpathian
range between Uzsok and the Jablonitza passes; otherwise his force
would lag behind in the great drive, a mere stationary pivot. At
that time he held about sixty miles of the Odessa-Stanisla