lakes; thus eight heavy guns were yesterday dug out or hauled out
of the water near Loetzen and Lake Widmin.
"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may, therefore,
now be considered as completely annihilated."
This summary was corrected in a later announcement, which stated
that the number of guns taken as booty in the pursuit after the
winter battle in Mazurian Land had risen to 300, including eighteen
heavy guns. This was published on the 23d of February. In an
announcement of the 26th of February the Great Headquarters amplified
its account of the victory with this statement:
"In the Russian official report the extent of the disaster in the
winter battle of Mazurian Land is either concealed or an attempt
is made to obscure it. It is unnecessary to go further into these
denials. As evidence of the extent of the defeat, the following
list of the positions held by the captured generals, however, may
serve:
"Of the Twentieth Army Corps: the commanding general, the commander
of the artillery, the commander of the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth
Infantry Divisions, and of the First Brigade of Infantry of the
Twenty-ninth Infantry Division. The commander of this latter division
succumbed to his wounds soon after being made prisoner.
"Of the Third Army Corps: the commander of the Twenty-seventh Infantry
Division and the commander of the artillery and of the Second Infantry
Brigade of this division.
"Of the Fifty-third Reserve Division: the division commander and
the commander of the First Infantry Brigade.
"Of the First Siberian Cossack Division: a brigade commander."
This brought the total of Russian generals captured up to eleven.
This account of one of the greatest battles of the European War
is necessarily based to a large extent on reports of the Germans,
owing to the fact that material from this source is virtually the
only official account available of the operation as a whole. The
Russian General Staff has contented itself with the following
announcement, made public on February 21, 1915:
"When the Germans, after a series of extraordinary obstinate and
persistent attacks which caused them heavy losses, had recognized
the impossibility of pressing in our front on the left bank of the
Vistula, they turned at the end of January to the execution of a
new plan. After the creation or several new corps in the interior of
the country, and the bringing up of troops from their west front, the
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