near the Radom-Kielce and the Konsk-Ostroviec railway crossings.
The opportunity of thinning the enemy's line in that sector was
too good to be lost, for a Russian communique of May 17, 1915,
states that "near Gielniow, Ruski-Brod, and Suchedniov our sudden
counterattacks inflicted severe losses on the enemy's advance guards."
Having thus checked the German advance for the time being, the
Russians ceased from further troubling to await developments on
the San.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIII

BATTLE OF THE SAN

When the Austro-German armies reached the line of the San on May
14, 1915, the battle for mid-Galicia was over, and a fresh chapter
of the campaign opened with the battle of the San, which might more
fittingly be described as the battle for Przemysl. The position
of Ivanoff's right has been shown; his right center lay west of
the Lower San; the center east of the river covered Przemysl; his
left center extended along the Upper Dniester, while his left,
under Lechitsky, was keeping Von Pflanzer-Baltin employed. Von
Mackensen's "phalanx" was slowly coming into action again, directing
its course toward the Russian center. The "phalanx" was compelled
to travel slowly, for it carried about 2,000 pieces of artillery
with ample munitions, and the railroads had been wrecked by the
retreating Russians. What has been described by military writers
as "Von Mackensen's phalanx" was a concentration of troops along
the lines on which the strongest resistance was expected or where
the quickest advance was intended. No special group of forces appear
to have been set apart for that purpose; there was very little
shifting about or regrouping necessary during the campaign, and
so well was the plan arranged that the concentrations occurred
almost automatically wherever and whenever they were most needed.
The infantry marched in successive lines or echelons, about forty
yards apart, while in the ranks the men were allowed about four
feet elbow room apiece. For frontal attacks this might be considered
fairly close formation, but Von Mackensen calculated more upon the
disintegrating effect of his artillery to first demoralize the
enemy and wreck his position, after which the infantry came into
play to complete the destruction. Without an overwhelming supply
of artillery the "phalanx" plan would have been unworkable--machine
guns would exact too heavy a sacrifice of life.

Ivanoff's chief object for t