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the encircling movements that had proved fatal to the Russians in the Mazurian "winter battle," for on the 10th of March he gave orders for the withdrawal of his entire army. The German airmen on this day reported the Russian columns on the march through the forest in full retreat toward Grodno all along the line from Giby to Sztabiz, far to the south. On the 11th of March, 1915, the German troops vigorously pushed the pursuit. They occupied Makarze, Froncki, and Giby. On the same night a German cavalry division took Kopciovo by assault. At this place alone they counted 300 dead Russians, and more than 5,000 prisoners, 12 machine guns, and 3 cannon, fell into the hands of the Germans. The threatened envelopment of this Russian army was typical of the method employed by the leaders under Von Hindenburg in local operations, as it was of German method in general when applied to operations extending over the entire field of action. It could be applied with special success where the German information service was superior to that of the Russians, as it usually was, and the movements of German troops were facilitated by good railway connections. In the Augustowo forests, however, rapidity of movement had to be achieved by the legs of the German soldiers to a large extent, and on this they prided themselves not a little. The operation just described was regarded by the German Great Headquarters as being of great significance, valuable for its moral effect in establishing in the German troops a sense of superiority, and confidence in their leadership, and for its infliction of material losses of considerable moment on the Russians. The Russians likewise claimed advantages from their forward thrust from Grodno. As represented by the Russian General Staff the withdrawal of the Germans from a front close to the line of the fortress in the first place was not a voluntary one, as it is pictured in the German account, but was forced by the strong pressure exerted by the Russian attacks following upon their retreat after the "winter battle." Thus they report the complete defeat of two German army corps, resulting in the seizure by the Russians of Height 100.3, which they described as dominating the entire region of the operations before Grodno. "In this battle," says the Russian report of March 5, 1915, "we took 1,000 prisoners and six cannon and a machine gun. Height 100.3 was defended by the Twenty-first Corps, the best of
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