n range. To some extent the fact that the fighting ships of
nearly all of the belligerent countries were thus equipped changed
battle tactics.

When the allied fleets had started their bombardment of the Turkish
forts at the Dardanelles they were breaking certain well-defined
rules which had been axiomatic with naval authorities. The greatest
of modern battleships were designed to fight with craft of their
like, but not to take issue with land fortifications. For weeks,
while the fleets succeeded in silencing for a time some of the
Turkish forts, it was thought that this rule no longer held good.
But when, after March 19, 1915, the fleets ceased attempting to
take the passage without military cooperation, the worth of the
rule was reestablished. The ease with which the bombarding ships
were made victims of hostile submarines was greatly instrumental
in making the rule again an axiom.

The naval supremacy of the allied powers brought them certain
advantages--advantages which they had without winning a decisive
victory. Germany and Austria were cut off from the Western Hemisphere,
and were troubled, in consequence, by shortage in food for their
civilian populations to a greater or lesser degree. This was perhaps
a negative benefit derived by the Allies from their naval supremacy;
the affirmative benefit was that their own communications with
the Western Hemisphere were maintained, enabling them not only to
get food for their civilian populations, but arms and munitions
for their armies; and even financial arrangements, which, if their
emissaries could not pass back and forth freely could not have
been made, depended on their control of the high seas.

They were able to keep the Channel clear of submarines long enough
to permit the passage of the troops, which England from time to
time during the first year of the war sent to the Continent, and
permitted the participation of the troops of the British overseas
dominions, the troops from Canada joining those in France, and
the troops from New Zealand and Australia taking their places in
the trenches along the Suez Canal and on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Thus, to a certain extent, the advantage of continuous railroad
communication which was enjoyed by the Teutonic allies "inside" the
arena of military operations was offset by the naval communication
maintained by the Entente Powers "outside" the arena of military
operations.

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