he determined
hostile counter-attacks. As I remarked at the beginning of this paper,
artillery ammunition was a constant anxiety to the higher commanders on
the Western Front also, but never, I believe, had Infantry to attack
with so little artillery support as the above. My position in France did
not give me any inside knowledge of the details of artillery supply, but
in one action at St. Eloi (near Ypres) on 14th or 15th February, in
which only 27th Division was concerned, the artillery of this Division
(so the C.R.A. informed me) alone fired 10,000 18-pr. rounds in one
night. At a similar action at the same place by the same division about
a month later the divisional artillery fired, I believe, a slightly
larger amount. Again, at Neuve Chapelle, in February, 1915, each
Division had its own divisional artillery and the ammunition expenditure
worked out to 150 rounds per 18-pr. gun. These official figures were
shown me a few days after the battle by the G.O.C., 2nd Army.

In comparing the ammunition expenditure of France in 1915 and in the
Dardanelles, the enormous discrepancy in the number of 18-prs. per
Division must be taken into account. Reckoning on the scale of the
number of 18-prs. allotted to a British Division in France, we had at
Helles little more than sufficient 18-prs. for one Division, yet with
this number we had to give artillery support to four Divisions. As to
the French artillery at Helles, they could always reckon on being able
to expend 40,000 to 45,000 rounds when their two Divisions attacked.

The complete absence of H.E. was severely felt, as shrapnel were of
little use for destroying trenches, machine gun emplacements, etc.
Therefore, in each and every British attack, success was jeopardized and
our infantry exposed to cruel losses, because, firstly, there was not
sufficient ammunition to prepare their attack, and, secondly, there was
no H.E. (except for howitzers) to destroy the machine guns in their
emplacements. The latter, therefore, inflicted great losses on our
Infantry in their advance.

Our unfortunate position did not escape the notice of the French, who
used at times generously to place under my command some of their field
guns and howitzers, but in the latter they were also lamentably
deficient, and in ammunition they were, themselves, during May and early
June, none too well provided, although towards July their reserves grew
more sufficient. The British deficiency in ammunition,