he most rudimentary and indispensable artillery
requisites for daily consumption; not to speak of downright carelessness
which resulted in wrong shells being sent to the wrong guns, and new
types of fuses being sent without fuse keys and new types of howitzer
shells without range tables. These serious faults provoked their own
penalties in the shape of the heavy losses suffered by our Infantry and
artillery, which might have been to a great measure averted if
sufficient forethought and attention had been devoted to the "side-show"
at the Dardanelles.

After commanding the starved artillery at Helles it was my good fortune
to command the artillery of the 21st Army Corps at the third Battle of
Gaza, in November, 1917, and also at the great Battle of 19th
September, 1918, in which the Turks in Palestine were finally crushed,
and I think it may add emphasis to what I have said if I contrast the
artillery support of the two campaigns and show the results which
ensued. On the night before the third Battle of Gaza, the artillery
under my command (to support three Divisions) consisted of the
following, viz.:--19-1/2 Batteries (i.e., 78 guns and howitzers) of
heavy artillery, comprising 8-inch howitzers, 6-inch guns, 6-inch
howitzers and 60-pr. guns--all of the most modern and up-to-date type.

The Field Artillery comprised 108 18-prs. and 36 4.5 howitzers while in
addition there were 8 modern mountain howitzers and guns. There was not
an artillery weapon in the whole Army Corps that was not efficient and
up-to-date, while immediately behind the front line existed perfectly
organized workshops capable of executing any repairs. There was ample
provision of spare guns, carriages and parts, and an abundance of trench
mortars which, though they would have changed the whole face of the
Peninsula conflict, could not be used in Palestine owing to the breadth
of No Man's Land. Ammunition for every nature of gun and howitzer was
pressed upon us in profusion--over a thousand rounds per gun was buried
and concealed near every Battery, while immediately behind the fighting
line huge reserves were available for immediate use if required. At the
advanced railhead, G.H.Q. literally built mountains of ammunition as a
further supply; all this in addition to vast quantities stored in depots
in Egypt and on the banks of the Suez Canal. So great was the
superabundance of shell, that hundreds of tons were left lying on the
ground after the nine day