back at 11 last night
from a further application of that commodity. As a result a fresh attack
will be made to-morrow morning by the IXth Corps and the LIVth
Division."

As to the New Army I point out to K. that "they are fighting under
conditions quite foreign to their training and moreover they have no
regulars to set them a standard": also, (and pray Heaven it is truth)
"Everyone is fully alive to the necessity for dash, so I trust the
attack of to-morrow will be much better done than were the two previous
attempts."

Hardly had my cable to K. been despatched when Stopford gives us a
sample specimen of "dash" by his answer to my reminder. He wires:--

* * * * *

"IXth Corps to G.H.Q. I foresee very great difficulty. The only system
possible at first probably will be convoy under escort."

Twelve hours ago, more or less, Stopford had agreed that there was a
difficulty which it was up to him to solve and that, at first, (i.e.,
till blockhouses had been built) the system would be convoy under
escort. We ask him what he had done, expecting to get the particulars
worked out by his Staff after the conference of Generals, and this is
the reply!

Five minutes later, in came another wire giving the general situation at
Suvla; saying the 53rd Division had failed to clear ground from which
the right of the advance of the 54th Division might be threatened, and
that Stopford wished to postpone his night march another four and twenty
hours.

So this is the result of our "ginger," and Braithwaite or I must rush
over to Suvla at once. Meanwhile, tactics and Kavak Tepe must wait.

Wired back:--

* * * * *

"In the circumstances the operation for to-morrow is postponed. Chief
sending C.G.S. over now to see you."

Braithwaite went: is back now: has seen both Stopford and Reed: has
agreed (with a sad heart) on my behalf to the night march being put off
another twenty four hours.

Have had, therefore, to cable K. again, shouldering the heavy blame of
this further delay:--

* * * * *

"(No. M.F. 545). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. After
anxiously weighing the pros and cons, I have decided that it is wiser to
wait another 24 hours before carrying out the general attack mentioned
in my No. M.F. 543. Braithwaite has just returned from the IXth Corps,
and he found that the spirit and general organization were imp