Helles, when,
automatically, he would have taken command in the Suvla area. What it
would have meant to have had a man imbued with the attack spirit at the
head of this IXth Corps would have been just--victory!

Anchored at 9 p.m. and, before going to bed, sent following cable:--

* * * * *

"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for War.

"The result of my visit to the IXth Corps, from which I am just back,
has bitterly disappointed me. There is nothing for it but to allow them
time to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional
Generals to undertake a general action for which, in their present frame
of mind, they have no heart. In fact, these generals are unfit for it.
With exceeding reluctance I am obliged to give them time to rest and
reorganize their troops.

"Though we were to repeat our landing operations a hundred times, we
would never dare hope to reproduce conditions so favourable as to put
one division ashore under cover of dark and, as the day broke, have the
next division sailing in to its support. No advantage was taken of these
favourable conditions and, for reasons which I can only explain by
letter, the swift advance was not delivered,--therefore, the mischief is
done. Until we are ready to advance again, reorganized and complete, we
must go slow."

_14th August, 1915. Imbros._ Before breakfast, Braithwaite brought me a
statement of our interview of last night with Stopford. He dictated it,
directly he got back last night; i.e., about three hours after the
event. I agree with every word:--

* * * * *

"Notes of an interview which took place on board H.M.S. _Triad_ between
6 and 7 p.m. on the 13th August, 1915, between the General Commanding
and Sir Frederick Stopford, commanding 9th Corps.

_Present_:--

General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.,
Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford,
K.C.M.G., etc.,
Major-General Braithwaite, C.B.

* * * * *

"Sir Frederick represented that the 9th Corps were not fit to undertake
an advance at the present moment. Questioned why, he replied that the
losses had been considerable, that the disorganization of units was very
great, and that the length of the line he had to hold was all too thinly
held as it was. He stated that his Divisional Generals were entirely of
the same opinion as himself; in fact, he gav