he Mahdi." Lord Wolseley adopted Gordon's
opinion. "No frontier force," he said, "can keep Mahdiism out of Egypt,
and the Mahdi sooner or later must be smashed, or he will smash you."
These views were shared by Lord Kitchener, Sir Redvers Buller, Sir
Charles Wilson, and by the military authorities generally.[57] Further,
the alleged necessity of "smashing the Mahdi," on the ground that his
success in the Soudan would be productive of serious results elsewhere,
exercised a powerful influence on British public opinion at this period,
although the best authorities on Eastern politics were at the time aware
that the fears so generally entertained in this connection were either
groundless or, at all events, greatly exaggerated.[58] Under these
circumstances, it was decided to "smash the Mahdi," and accordingly a
proclamation, giving effect to the declared policy of the British
Government, was issued. Shortly afterwards, the Penjdeh incident
occurred. Public opinion in England somewhat calmed down, having found
its natural safety-valve in an acrimonious parliamentary debate, in
which the Government narrowly escaped defeat. The voices of politicians
and diplomatists, which had been to some degree hushed by the din of
arms, began to be heard. The proclamation was cancelled. The project of
reconquering the Soudan was postponed to a more convenient period. It
was, in fact, accomplished thirteen years later, under circumstances
which differed very materially from those which prevailed in 1885. In
June 1885, the Government of Lord Salisbury succeeded to that of Mr.
Gladstone, and, though strongly urged to undertake the reconquest of the
Soudan, confirmed the decision of its predecessors.
Sir George Arthur, writing in the _Fortnightly Review_, strongly
condemns this "cynical disavowal" of Lord Wolseley's proclamation. I
have nothing to say in favour of the issue of that proclamation. I am
very clearly of opinion that, as it was issued, it was wise that it
should be cancelled. For, in truth, subsequent events showed that the
forecast made by Lord Wolseley and by Gordon was erroneous, in that it
credited the Mahdi with a power of offence which he was far from
possessing. No serious difficulty arose in defending the frontier of
Egypt from Dervish attack. The overthrow of the Mahdi's power, though
eminently desirable, was very far from constituting an imperious
necessity such as was commonly supposed to exist in 1885. In this
instance,
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