ture to deal with
this question prior to 1904, for any serious modification of the regime
of the Capitulations could not be considered as within the domain of
practical politics so long as all the Powers, and more especially France
and England, were pulling different ways. But directly that agreement
was signed I resolved to take the question up, all the more so because
what was then known as the Secret Agreement, but which has since that
time been published, contained the following very important clause:

In the event of their (His Britannic Majesty's Government)
considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to
assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in
other civilised countries, the Government of the French Republic
will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the
understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to
entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French
Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing
similar reforms in Morocco.

I was under no delusion as to the formidable nature of the obstacles
which stood in the way of reform. Moreover, I held very strongly that
even if it had been possible, by diplomatic negotiations with the other
Powers, to come to some arrangement which would be binding on the
Europeans resident in Egypt, and to force it on them without their
consent being obtained, it was most undesirable to adopt anything
approaching to this procedure. The European colonists in Egypt, although
of course numerically far inferior to the native population, represent a
large portion of the wealth, and a still larger portion of the
intelligence and energy in the country. Moreover, although the word
"privilege" always rather grates on the ear in this democratic age, it
is none the less true that in the past the misgovernment of Egypt has
afforded excellent reasons why even those Europeans who are most
favourably disposed towards native aspirations should demur to any
sacrifice of their capitulary rights. My view, therefore, was that the
Europeans should not be coerced but persuaded. It had to be proved to
them that, under the changed condition of affairs, the Capitulations
were not only unnecessary but absolutely detrimental to their own
interests. Personally, I was very fully convinced of the truth of this
statement, neither was it difficult to convince those who, being behind