ation of the principle enunciated by Aquinas was in the case
of one person's extreme necessity which required almsgiving from
another's superfluity, but, even short of such cases, there were rules
of conduct in respect of the user of property on all occasions which
were of extreme importance in the economic life of the time.

[Footnote 1: Goyau insists on the importance of the words 'procure'
and 'dispense.' 'Dont le premier eveille l'idee d'une constante
sollicitude, et dont le second evoque l'image d'une generosite
sympathetique' (_Autaur du Catholicisme Sociale_, vol. ii. p. 93).]

[Footnote 2: II. ii. 66, 2. In another part of the _Summa_ the same
distinction is clearly laid down. 'Bona temporalia quae* homini
divinitus conferuntur, ejus quidem sunt quantum ad proprietatem; sed
quantum ad usum non solum desent esse ejus, sed aliorum qui en eis
sustentari possunt en eo quod ei superfluit,' II. ii. 32, 6, ad 2.]

[Footnote 3: Janssen, _op. cit._, vol. ii. p. 91.]

[Footnote 4: The Abbe Calippe summarises St. Thomas's doctrine as
follows: 'Le droit de propriete est un droit reel; mais ce n'est pas
un droit illimite, les proprietaires ont des devoirs; ils ont des
devoirs parce que Dieu qui a cree la terre ne l'a pas creee pour eux
seuls, mais pour tous' (_Semaine Sociale de France_, 1909, p. 123).
According to Antoninus of Florence, goods could be evilly acquired,
evilly distributed, or evilly consumed (_Irish Theological Quarterly_,
vol. vii. p. 146).]

[Footnote 5: On the application of this principle by the popes in the
thirteenth and fifteenth centuries in the case of their own estates,
see Ardant, _Papes et Paysans_, a work which must be read with a
certain degree of caution (Nitti, _Catholic Socialism_, p. 290).]

These principles for the guidance of the owner of property are
not collected under any single heading in the _Summa_, but must be
gathered from the various sections dealing with man's duty to his
fellow-men and to himself. One leading virtue which was inculcated
with great emphasis by Aquinas was that of temperance. 'All
pleasurable things which come within the use of man,' we read in the
section dealing with this subject, 'are ordered to some necessity of
this life as an end. And therefore temperance accepts the necessity
of this life as a rule or measure of the things one uses, so that,
to wit, they should be used according as the necessity of this life
requires.'[1] St. Thomas explains, moreover