the use of man, therefore the proper act of
liberality is the good use of money and other riches.'[2] Moreover,
'it belongs to a virtuous man not simply to use well the goods which
form the matter of his actions, but also to prepare the means and the
occasions to use them well; thus the brave soldier sharpens his blade
and keeps it in the scabbard, as well as exercising it on the enemy;
in like manner, the liberal man should prepare and reserve his riches
for a suitable use.'[3] It appears from this that to save part of
one's annual income to provide against emergencies in the future,
either by means of insurance or by investing in productive
enterprises, is an act of liberality.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 117, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._, ad. 3.]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid._, ad. 2. 'Potest concludi quod accipere et
custodire modificata sunt acta liberalitatis.... Major per hoc
probatur quod dantem multotiens et consumentem, nihil autem
accipientem et custodientem cito derelinqueret substantia temporalis;
et ita perirent omnis ejus actus quia non habent amplius quid dare
et consumere.... Hic autem acceptio et custodia sic modificari debet.
Primo quidem oportet ut non sit injusta; secundo quod non sit de
cupiditate vel avaritia suspecta propter excessum; tertio quod non
permittat labi substantiam propter defectum ... Dare quando oportet et
custodire quando oportet dare contrariantur; sed dare quando oportet
et custodire quando oportet non contrariantur' (Buridan, _Eth._, iv.
2).]

The question is then discussed whether liberality is a part of
justice. Aquinas concludes 'that liberality is not a species
of justice, because justice renders to another what is his, but
liberality gives him what is the giver's own. Still, it has a certain
agreement with justice in two points; first that it is to another,
as justice also is; secondly, that it is about exterior things like
justice, though in another way. And therefore liberality is laid down
by some to be a part of justice as a virtue annexed to justice as an
accessory to a principal.'[1] Again, 'although liberality supposes not
any legal debt as justice does, still it supposes a certain moral debt
considering what is becoming in the person himself who practises the
virtue, not as though he had any obligation to the other party;
and therefore there is about it very little of the character of a
debt.'[2]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 117, art. 5.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._, ad. 1.]

It i