ned by the intrinsic excellence of the thing itself,
because, if it were, a fly would be more valuable than a pearl, as
being intrinsically more excellent.[1] Nor is the value to be measured
by the mere utility of the object for satisfying the material needs
of man, for in that case, corn should be worth more than precious
stones.[2] The value of an object is to be measured by its capacity
for satisfying men's wants. 'Valor rerum aestimatur secundum humanam
indigentiam.... Dicendum est quod indigentia humana est mensura
naturalis commutabilium; quod probatur sic: bonitas sive valor rei
attenditur ex fine propter quem exhibetur: unde commentator secundo
Metaphysicae _nihil est bonum nisi propter causas finales_; sed finis
naturalis ad quem justitia commutativa ordinet exteriora commutabilia
est supplementum indigentiae humanae...; igitur supplementum
indigentiae humanae est vera mensura commutabilium. Sed supplementum
videtur mensurari per indigentiam; majoris enim valoris est
supplementum quod majorem supplet indigentiam.... Item hoc probatur
signo, quia videmus quod illo tempore quo vina deficiunt quia magis
indigeremus eis ipsa fiunt cariora....[3]

[Footnote 1: 'In justitia commutativa non estimatur pretium
commutabilium secundum naturalem valorem ipsorum, sic enim musca plus
valeret quam totus aurum mundi' (Buridan, _op. cit._, v. 14).]

[Footnote 2: Slater, 'Value in Theology and Political Economy,' _Irish
Ecclesiastical Record_, Sept. 1901.]

[Footnote 3: Buridan, _op. cit._, v. 14 and 16. Antoninus of Florence
says that value is determined by three factors, _virtuositas_,
_raritas_, and _placibilitas_ (_Summa_, ii. 1, 16.)]

The capacity of an object for satisfying man's needs could not be
measured by its capacity for satisfying the needs of this or that
individual, but by its capacity for satisfying the needs of the
average member of the community.[1] The Abbe Desbuquois, in the
article from which we have already quoted, finds in this elevation of
the common estimation an illustration of the general principle of the
mediaevals, which we have seen at work in their teaching on the use of
property, that the individual benefit must always be subordinated to
the general welfare. According to him, it is but one application of
the duty of using one's goods for the common good. 'In the same way,
in allowing the right of exchange--a right, let us remark in passing,
which is but an application of the right of property