h,
intellectualized, may be represented as expectations of the presence
or absence of correlations. A thing which "feels real" inspires us with
hopes or fears, expectations or curiosities, which are wholly absent
when a thing "feels imaginary." The feeling of reality is a feeling akin
to respect: it belongs PRIMARILY to whatever can do things to us without
our voluntary co-operation. This feeling of reality, related to
the memory-image, and referred to the past by the specific kind of
belief-feeling that is characteristic of memory, seems to be what
constitutes the act of remembering in its pure form.

We may now summarize our analysis of pure memory.

Memory demands (a) an image, (b) a belief in past existence. The belief
may be expressed in the words "this existed."

The belief, like every other, may be analysed into (1) the believing,
(2) what is believed. The believing is a specific feeling or sensation
or complex of sensations, different from expectation or bare assent in
a way that makes the belief refer to the past; the reference to the
past lies in the belief-feeling, not in the content believed. There is
a relation between the belief-feeling and the content, making the
belief-feeling refer to the content, and expressed by saying that the
content is what is believed.

The content believed may or may not be expressed in words. Let us
take first the case when it is not. In that case, if we are merely
remembering that something of which we now have an image occurred,
the content consists of (a) the image, (b) the feeling, analogous
to respect, which we translate by saying that something is "real" as
opposed to "imaginary," (c) a relation between the image and the feeling
of reality, of the sort expressed when we say that the feeling refers
to the image. This content does not contain in itself any
time-determination.

The time-determination lies in the nature of the belief feeling, which
is that called "remembering" or (better) "recollecting." It is only
subsequent reflection upon this reference to the past that makes us
realize the distinction between the image and the event recollected.
When we have made this distinction, we can say that the image "means"
the past event.

The content expressed in words is best represented by the words "the
existence of this," since these words do not involve tense, which
belongs to the belief-feeling, not to the content. Here "this" is
a vague term, covering the memory-ima