XII. BELIEF

Belief, which is our subject to-day, is the central problem in the
analysis of mind. Believing seems the most "mental" thing we do,
the thing most remote from what is done by mere matter. The whole
intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the passage from one
belief to another by what is called "reasoning." Beliefs give knowledge
and error; they are the vehicles of truth and falsehood. Psychology,
theory of knowledge and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the
view we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends.

Before embarking upon the detailed analysis of belief, we shall do well
to note certain requisites which any theory must fulfil.

(1) Just as words are characterized by meaning, so beliefs are
characterized by truth or falsehood. And just as meaning consists in
relation to the object meant, so truth and falsehood consist in
relation to something that lies outside the belief. You may believe that
such-and-such a horse will win the Derby. The time comes, and your horse
wins or does not win; according to the outcome, your belief was true or
false. You may believe that six times nine is fifty-six; in this case
also there is a fact which makes your belief false. You may believe that
America was discovered in 1492, or that it was discovered in 1066. In
the one case your belief is true, in the other false; in either case
its truth or falsehood depends upon the actions of Columbus, not upon
anything present or under your control. What makes a belief true or
false I call a "fact." The particular fact that makes a given belief
true or false I call its "objective,"* and the relation of the belief to
its objective I call the "reference" or the "objective reference" of the
belief. Thus, if I believe that Columbus crossed the Atlantic in 1492,
the "objective" of my belief is Columbus's actual voyage, and the
"reference" of my belief is the relation between my belief and the
voyage--that relation, namely, in virtue of which the voyage makes my
belief true (or, in another case, false). "Reference" of beliefs differs
from "meaning" of words in various ways, but especially in the fact that
it is of two kinds, "true" reference and "false" reference. The truth
or falsehood of a belief does not depend upon anything intrinsic to
the belief, but upon the nature of its relation to its objective. The
intrinsic nature of belief can be treated without reference to what
makes it true or false. In the