crossing of
the Rubicon was an historical physical event, which is distinct from the
present contents of every present mind. What is believed, however true
it may be, is not the actual fact that makes the belief true, but a
present event related to the fact. This present event, which is what is
believed, I shall call the "content" of the belief. We have already had
occasion to notice the distinction between content and objective in the
case of memory-beliefs, where the content is "this occurred" and the
objective is the past event.

(4) Between content and objective there is sometimes a very wide gulf,
for example in the case of "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." This gulf may,
when it is first perceived, give us a feeling that we cannot really
"know" anything about the outer world. All we can "know," it may be
said, is what is now in our thoughts. If Caesar and the Rubicon cannot
be bodily in our thoughts, it might seem as though we must remain cut
off from knowledge of them. I shall not now deal at length with this
feeling, since it is necessary first to define "knowing," which cannot
be done yet. But I will say, as a preliminary answer, that the feeling
assumes an ideal of knowing which I believe to be quite mistaken. It
assumes, if it is thought out, something like the mystic unity of knower
and known. These two are often said to be combined into a unity by the
fact of cognition; hence when this unity is plainly absent, it may
seem as if there were no genuine cognition. For my part, I think such
theories and feelings wholly mistaken: I believe knowing to be a very
external and complicated relation, incapable of exact definition,
dependent upon causal laws, and involving no more unity than there is
between a signpost and the town to which it points. I shall return to
this question on a later occasion; for the moment these provisional
remarks must suffice.

(5) The objective reference of a belief is connected with the fact that
all or some of the constituents of its content have meaning. If I say
"Caesar conquered Gaul," a person who knows the meaning of the three
words composing my statement knows as much as can be known about the
nature of the objective which would make my statement true. It is clear
that the objective reference of a belief is, in general, in some way
derivative from the meanings of the words or images that occur in its
content. There are, however, certain complications which must be borne
in mind. In