on, a content is said to be "believed" when it causes us to
move. The images aroused are the same if you say to me, "Suppose there
were an escaped tiger coming along the street," and if you say to me,
"There is an escaped tiger coming along the street." But my actions will
be very different in the two cases: in the first, I shall remain calm;
in the second, it is possible that I may not. It is suggested, by the
theory we are considering, that this difference of effects constitutes
what is meant by saying that in the second case I believe the
proposition suggested, while in the first case I do not. According
to this view, images or words are "believed" when they cause bodily
movements.

I do not think this theory is adequate, but I think it is suggestive
of truth, and not so easily refutable as it might appear to be at first
sight.

It might be objected to the theory that many things which we certainly
believe do not call for any bodily movements. I believe that Great
Britain is an island, that whales are mammals, that Charles I was
executed, and so on; and at first sight it seems obvious that such
beliefs, as a rule, do not call for any action on my part. But when we
investigate the matter more closely, it becomes more doubtful. To begin
with, we must distinguish belief as a mere DISPOSITION from actual
active belief. We speak as if we always believed that Charles I was
executed, but that only means that we are always ready to believe it
when the subject comes up. The phenomenon we are concerned to analyse
is the active belief, not the permanent disposition. Now, what are
the occasions when, we actively believe that Charles I was executed?
Primarily: examinations, when we perform the bodily movement of writing
it down; conversation, when we assert it to display our historical
erudition; and political discourses, when we are engaged in showing what
Soviet government leads to. In all these cases bodily movements (writing
or speaking) result from our belief.

But there remains the belief which merely occurs in "thinking." One may
set to work to recall some piece of history one has been reading, and
what one recalls is believed, although it probably does not cause any
bodily movement whatever. It is true that what we believe always MAY
influence action. Suppose I am invited to become King of Georgia: I find
the prospect attractive, and go to Cook's to buy a third-class ticket to
my new realm. At the last moment I remembe