ring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted,
and 100,000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign was
not a success. Even 100,000 men soon wore thin when spread out over the
vast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle,
harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing the
French in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks "dug in," and
a deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon
caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to "carry on" as
the Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtually
on a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the
November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990,000 to
10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by the
Allies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was out
of the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilities
with the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something very
different from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist regime. The
Allies' weapon had thus broken in their hands.

Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority in
Asia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he was
establishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange to
find such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-British
policy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearly
explained by no less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab
Revolution"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speak
his mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion.
In one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said:
"The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because the
Turkish Government was notably bad, but because they wanted
independence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters,
to become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State of
their own." The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arab
nationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed to
the Syrian adventure. Said this leader: "Both the French and the English
should know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religion
with the Turks, and have been politically identified with them for
centuries, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from