e Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the
Egyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings of
Bolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire was
proving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000
sterling, with no relief in sight.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England and
France Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood of
criticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. The
Mesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. For
example, Colonel Lawrence stated: "We are to-day not far from disaster.
Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14,000
local conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabs
in maintaining peace. We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armoured
cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10,000 Arabs
in the rising this summer."[190] Influenced by such criticisms and by
the general trend of events, the British Government modified its
attitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir
Percy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realities
and an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discuss
large concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made a
good impression upon them. At this writing matters have not been
definitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limit
her direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head of
the Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914.

Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintaining
relative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highly
unstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even the
Catholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating.
General Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting the
leaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's only
real friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things
have not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leygues
remarked of Syria, "France will occupy all of it, and always"; while
still more recently General Gouraud stated: "France must remain in
Syria, both for political and economic reasons. The political
consequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Our
prestige and influence in