FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86  
87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   >>   >|  
sitions may be useful to one who does not know the language; and Definitions, which are verbal propositions whose predicates analyse the whole connotations of their subjects, are indispensable instruments of science (see chap. xxii.). Of course, hypothetical propositions may also be verbal, as _If the soul be material it is extended_; for 'extension' is connoted by 'matter'; and, therefore, the corresponding disjunctive is verbal--_Either the soul is not material, or it is extended_. But a true divisional disjunctive can never be verbal (chap. xxi. Sec. 4, rule 1). On the other hand, when there is no such direct relation between subject and predicate that their connotations imply one another, but the predicate connotes something that cannot be learnt from the connotation of the subject, there is no longer tautology, but an enlargement of meaning--e.g., _Masters are degraded by their slaves; The horse is the noblest animal; Red is the favourite colour of the British army; If the soul is simple, it is indestructible_. Such propositions are called Real, Synthetic, or Ampliative, because they are propositions for which a mere understanding of their subjects would be no substitute, since the predicate adds a meaning of its own concerning matter of fact. To any one who understands the language, a verbal proposition can never be an inference or conclusion from evidence; nor can a verbal proposition ever furnish grounds for an inference, except as to the meaning of words. The subject of real and verbal propositions will inevitably recur in the chapters on Definition; but tautologies are such common blemishes in composition, and such frequent pitfalls in argument, that attention cannot be drawn to them too early or too often. CHAPTER VI CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE Sec. 1. The word Inference is used in two different senses, which are often confused but should be carefully distinguished. In the first sense, it means a process of thought or reasoning by which the mind passes from facts or statements presented, to some opinion or expectation. The data may be very vague and slight, prompting no more than a guess or surmise; as when we look up at the sky and form some expectation about the weather, or from the trick of a man's face entertain some prejudice as to his character. Or the data may be important and strongly significant, like the footprint that frightened Crusoe into thinking of cannibals, or as whe
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86  
87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
verbal
 

propositions

 

subject

 

predicate

 

meaning

 
disjunctive
 

matter

 
expectation
 

proposition

 
inference

connotations
 

subjects

 

language

 

extended

 
material
 
INFERENCE
 

IMMEDIATE

 

Inference

 

carefully

 
distinguished

confused
 

senses

 

CONDITIONS

 

Definition

 
tautologies
 

common

 
cannibals
 

chapters

 

inevitably

 

blemishes


composition

 
thinking
 
CHAPTER
 
attention
 
frequent
 
pitfalls
 

argument

 
prejudice
 

surmise

 
entertain

weather

 

character

 
prompting
 
statements
 

presented

 

frightened

 
Crusoe
 

passes

 

thought

 

reasoning