ime powers--of Spain, of France,
which had absorbed the Italian maritime states, of the Netherlands,
of Denmark. Warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and
uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the British Navy
into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained
force than it had been throughout its previous history. Its long
employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the
failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession
is only too sure to foster. It had, however, a confidence--not
unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility.
This confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously
exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into
the past. The new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of
the Atlantic was not considered formidable. In the British Navy
there were 145,000 men. In the United States Navy the number
of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service
was less than 4500--an insignificant numerical addition to the
enemies with whom we were already contending. The subsequent
and rapid increase in the American _personnel_ to 18,000 shows
the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular'
force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered
by the hastily enrolled additions. Our defeats in the war of
1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did
constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly
significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. Rebuffs
of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New
Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco,
Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat.

When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian
commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably
still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the
contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army. Even those
who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of
contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians.
Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats
with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of
hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of
superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign
to make peace to avoid further disasters.

At the beginning of the Franco-German