distinct but dependent being is
impossible? In regard to questions such as these, the appeal must lie to
that common sense, or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of
every thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by the
arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. These
definitions must commend themselves _as true_, either by their own
self-evidencing light, or by their manifest conformity with experience,
before they can be assumed and founded on in any process of reasoning;
and we are very sure that those which have been specified cannot be
candidly examined without appearing to be, as they really are, the
grossest instances of a _petitio principii_ that have ever been offered
to the world. For these "definitions" constitute the foundation of the
whole superstructure; they contain the germ, which is subsequently
expanded and developed in a long series of propositions; and, as they
are assumed without proof, while they are far from being self-evident,
no amount of logical power and no effort of dialectic skill can possibly
extract from them any doctrinal results, whether theological, ethical,
or political, possessing greater evidence than what belongs to
themselves. This is our _first_ objection.

2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our special
subject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or experimental
method; it is an argument _a priori_, a deductive process of reasoning.
Now, this method, suitable as it is to a certain class of subjects, such
as those of Geometry, in which clear and precise definitions are
attainable, is either utterly inapplicable to another class of subjects,
such as most of those of which Spinoza treats, or it is peculiarly
dangerous, especially in the hands of a daring speculator, since, in the
absence of adequate definitions, he may be tempted to have recourse to
such as are purely arbitrary. All the possible properties of a circle
may be deduced from the simple definition of it; but it will not follow
that all the possible forms of being in nature may be deduced from the
definition of "substance." The reason is clear; we cannot have such a
definition of substance as we may have of a circle. We do not object
merely to the _geometrical form_ of his reasoning,--that is a mere
accessory, and one which renders the "Ethica" much more dry and less
attractive than the "Tractatus," in which he gives free scope to his
subtle intellect,