of being and thought_, such as Pantheism requires, there is a
vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the _logical
relations_ of our ideas are identical with the _real relations_ of
beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It
describes the relations of being according to the logical relations of
our thought; and it takes _logic_ for a kind of _metaphysic_. It
confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve
the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to
other beings? That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other
beings, and must virtually contain them all; nay, it must be capable of
becoming all things. It must therefore be simple, indeterminate,
indifferent, possessing no essential character, resembling nothing that
we actually know. All this is true of our _ideas_, but not of _beings_.
The highest idea,--that which is the logical condition of all others, and
also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,--this
idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it
becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the _idea_ is
not true of the _being_; no such vague, indeterminate, indifferent being
exists; and yet Pantheism confounds _the idea_ with _the being_, and
rests entirely on that confusion of thought."

* * * * *

In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a
few remarks illustrative of its _nature and tendency_, whether
considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a substitute for
religious belief.

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory
of "Idealism," and the doctrine of "Identity," which constitute the
groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse
to our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to
our belief in the reality of an external world, or in the existence and
personality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these
_three_ topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be
impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their
legitimate consequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole
question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly it has
not been duly considered by the more superficial _litterateurs_, who
have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism; but i