y the idea of
Absolute Being; it accounts for the concrete by the abstract; it
represents all individual beings as mere modes or affections of one
universal substance; in other words, it _realises_ the abstract idea of
thought and extension, but _denies the existence_ of bodies and souls,
otherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences.

4. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole reasoning on the
subject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent fallacy. He affirms the
impossibility of Creation, and attempts to demonstrate his position. But
how? By proving that a "substance" cannot be produced. And why may not
"a substance" be produced? Because, _by the definition_, "a substance"
is that which is "self-existent." In other words, a self-existent
substance cannot be created,--a truism which scarcely required the
apparatus of a geometrical proof by means of propositions, scholia, and
corollaries, or, as Professor Saisset says, with laconic naivete, "_ce
qui a a peine besoin d'etre demontre_." But, while the only proof that
is offered extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated
substance, it is afterwards applied to everything that exists, so as to
exclude the creation even of that which is _not_ self-existent; and this
on the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either a
"substance," or an "attribute," or a "mode." And thus, partly by an
ambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and gratuitous assumption,
he excludes the possibility of Creation altogether. Surely it might have
occurred to him that by proving the necessary existence of an uncreated
Being--a doctrine held by every Christian Theist--he did not advance one
step towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even
towards the establishment of his favorite theory of _unisubstancisme_;
for, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent Being; grant,
even, that there can be no more than _one_,--would it follow that there
can be no created and dependent beings, or that they can only exist as
"modes" or "affections" of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist
as _creatures_, as _products_, as _effects_, without partaking of the
nature of their cause?[126] Yet, if there be one idea more than another
which Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of creation, and he
summons the whole strength, both of his logic and sarcasm, when he has
to deal with the argument from "final causes." And no marvel; for