infinite "substance."

It is important to remark that, according to this theory, _the distinct
personality of man_ is excluded, not less than _the distinct personality
of God_. It is not easy, indeed, to explain this part of Spinoza's
theory; for he has a subtle disquisition on the relation subsisting
between the soul and the body, by means of which he attempts to explain
the phenomena of self-consciousness, and to show that individual
personality is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine which
represents man as a mere "mode" of the Divine "substance." But one thing
is clear: there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct
personality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. The
unity, especially of the human soul, its individuality, its
self-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent, indeed, on God,
but really distinct from Him, must be sacrificed, if the system is to be
saved; and no other being can be recognized but the absolute
"substance," with its infinite "attributes" and its finite "modes." This
consideration appears to us to be fatal to the whole theory. For it
shows that the Pantheistic speculations, which are directed against _the
personality of God_, are equally conclusive, if they be conclusive at
all, against _the personality of Man_; that they run counter to the
intuitive knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be embraced
without doing violence to some of our clearest and surest convictions.
For what clearer or surer conviction can there be than that of my own
personal existence, as a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active,
and responsible being? And yet the existence of our own bodies and souls
is denied, except in so far as they are mere "modes" or affections of
the one uncreated "substance," which is known, not by experience or
observation, but by a transcendental faculty of intuition.

And, _finally_, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because the
exposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring
self-contradictions. His logical power has been so much admired, and his
rigorous geometrical method so highly extolled, that his Philosophy has
acquired a certain _prestige_, which commends it to many ardent,
speculative minds. Yet there are few philosophical writers who have made
a larger number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded more in
contradictory statements. The "Antinomies" of Spinoza might make the
subject of an