virtue. For
Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that
"virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in
the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be
a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed
it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all
your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now
Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love"
is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general
prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what
is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues,
viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special
virtue.

_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as
shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper
object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so
that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special
kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of
happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of
charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
Therefore charity is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue,
not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue
depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In
this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues,
as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on
prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last
end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other
ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of
horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object
the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows
t