e
their strength with him in a pitched battle?

If there is any thing more astonishing than another in the history of
the Roman Republic, it is the unconquerable spirit, the persevering
energy, the invincible determination with which, under every calamity,
and often in the very extremity of adverse fortune, they combined to
struggle for the superiority, and at length attained it--not so much by
conquering as by wearing out their adversaries. In no period of their
long and glorious annals was this transcendent quality more strikingly
evinced than in the second Punic War, when, after the battle of Cannae,
Capua, the second city of Italy, yielded to the influence of Hannibal,
and nearly a half of the Roman colonies, worn out by endless exactions
in men and money, refused to send any further succours. The heroic
spirit the Roman senate then evinced, the extraordinary sacrifices they
made, may, without exaggeration, be pronounced without parallel in the
annals of mankind, if we reflect on the length of time during which
these sacrifices were required. But while this invincible spirit
augments our admiration of the Roman character, and makes us feel that
they indeed deserved that mighty dominion which they afterwards
attained, it takes much from the merit of their individual commanders.
It was almost impossible to avoid ultimate success with such armies to
lead, and so heroic a people to sustain the efforts and furnish the
muniments of war. But the case was very different at Carthage. So
vehement was the spirit of party which had seized upon its inhabitants,
in consequence of the great accession of democratic power which had been
conceded, fatally for the state, as Polybius tells us, a short time
before to the people, that Hannibal could rely on no assistance on his
own government. Though he brought the Romans to the very brink of ruin,
and placed final victory within the grasp, as it were, of his country,
yet they would not put out their hand to snatch it. They were more
jealous of him than afraid of their enemies. Though he descended to the
southern extremity of Italy, and drew near to Sicily, in order to obtain
from the African shores the necessary succours to recruit his armies,
wasted by the very number of his victories; and though they had during
great part of the time the superiority at sea--yet he received no
supplies of men or money from home during the fifteen years he carried
on the war in Italy, with the exception