ded with us, but indifference whether what we do be
materially, or in the nature of the thing abstracted from our way of
considering it, Good and Right,--such indifference is utterly
inconsistent with Sincerity.
No person who has just notions of God can be afraid of His displeasure
any further than as he is afraid of his own Character, whether it be what
it ought: but so far as a man has reason to fear his own character, so
far there must be reason to fear God's displeasure, or disapprobation;
not from any doubt of His Perfection and Goodness, but merely from the
belief of it.
Is it possible that people can be Scepticks in _Opinion_, and yet without
any doubtfulness, or solicitude about their _Actions_ and _Behaviour_?
II.
What a wonderful incongruity it is for a man to see the doubtfulness in
which things are involved, and yet be impatient out of action, or
vehement in it! Say a man is a Sceptick, and add what was said of
Brutus, _quicquid vult valde vult_, and you say, there is the greatest
Contrariety between his Understanding and his Temper that can be
expressed in words.
* * * * *
In general a man ought not to do other people's duty for them; for their
duty was appointed them for their exercise; and besides, who will do it
in case of his death? Nor has a man any right to raise in others such a
dependance upon him as that they must be miserable in case of his death,
tho' whilst he lives he answers that dependance.
* * * * *
Hobbs' definition of Benevolence, that 'tis the love of power is base and
false, but there is more of truth in it than appears at first sight; the
real Benevolence of men being, I think, for the most part, not indeed the
single love of power, but the love of power to be exercised in the way of
doing good; that is a different thing from the love of the good or
happiness of others by whomsoever effected, which last I call single or
simple Benevolence. How little there is of this in the world may appear
by observing, how many persons can bear with great tranquillity that a
friend or child should live in misery, who yet cannot bear the thought of
their death.
Good men surely are not treated in this world as they deserve, yet 'tis
seldom, very seldom their goodness which makes them disliked, even in
cases where it may seem to be so: but 'tis some behaviour or other, which
however excusable, perhaps infinitely overbalanced by their virtues, yet
is offensive, possibly wrong
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