_ to be influenced by right motives is
a _sine qua non_ to Virtuous Actions, an Indifferency to right motives
must _incapacitate_ us for Virtuous Actions, or render us in that
particular not moral agents. I do indeed think that no Rational Creature
is _strictly speaking Indifferent_ to Right Motives, but yet there seems
to be somewhat which to all intents of the present question is the same,
viz. _a stronger disposition to be influenced by contrary or wrong
motives_, and this I take to be always the Case when any vice is
committed. But since it may be said, as you hint, that this stronger
disposition to be influenced by Vicious Motives may have been contracted
by repeated Acts of Wickedness, we will pitch upon the _first Vicious
Action_ any one is guilty of. No man would have committed this first
Vicious Action if he had not had a _stronger_ (at least as strong)
_disposition_ in him to be influenced by the _Motives of the Vicious
Action_, than by the _motives of the contrary Virtuous Action_; from
whence I infallibly conclude, that since every man has committed some
first Vice, every man had, _antecedent_ to the commission of it, a
_stronger disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ than the
_Virtuous_ motive. My difficulty upon this is, that a _stronger natural
disposition_ to be influenced by the Vicious than the Virtuous Motive
(which every one has antecedent to his first vice), seems, to all
purposes of the present question, to put the Man in the same condition as
though he was _indifferent to the Virtuous Motive_; and since an
_indifferency to the Virtuous Motive_ would have _incapacitated_ a Man
from being a _moral Agent_, or _contracting guilt_, is not a _stronger
disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ Motive as great an
_Incapacity_? Suppose I have two diversions offered me, _both_ of which
I could not enjoy, I like both of them, but yet have a _stronger_
inclination to one than to the other, I am not indeed strictly
_indifferent_ to either, because I should be glad to _enjoy both_; but am
I not exactly _in the same case_, _to all intents and purposes of
acting_, as though I was _absolutely indifferent_ to that diversion which
I have the _least_ inclination to? You suppose Man to be endued
naturally with a _disposition to be influenced by Virtuous Motives_, and
that _this Disposition is a sine qua non to Virtuous Actions_, both which
I fully believe; but then you _omit_ to consider the natural I