tances Sir Eric Geddes was offered the post of Admiralty
Controller by Sir Edward Carson, then First Lord, and accepted it. It
was arranged that a naval officer should continue to hold the post of
Third Sea Lord and that he should be jointly responsible, so far as the
Navy was concerned, for all _design_ work on its technical side, whether
for ships, ordnance material, mines, torpedoes, etc., etc., whilst the
Controller became entirely responsible for _production_. It was obvious
that goodwill and tact would be required to start this new organization,
which was decidedly complicated, and that the post of Third Sea Lord
would be difficult to fill. At the request of Sir Eric Geddes
Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey, C.B., who at that time was Fourth Sea Lord,
was asked if he would become Third Sea Lord in the new organization. He
consented and was appointed. When the detailed organization, drawn up to
meet the views of Sir E. Geddes, was examined by the naval officers
responsible for armament work, strong objections were raised to that
part of the organization which affected their responsibility for the
control and approval of designs and of inspection.

Sir Eric held the view that inspection should come under the officials
in charge of production and that the designing staff should also be
under him, the designs being drawn up to meet the views of the naval
officers and finally approved by them. Personally I saw no _danger_ in
the proposals regarding design, because the responsibility of the naval
officer for final approval was recognized; but there was a certain
possibility of delay if the naval technical officer lost control over
the designing staff. I fully agreed with the criticisms on the subject
of inspection, the argument being that only naval officers accustomed to
_use_ the ordnance material could know the dangers that might arise from
faulty inspection, and that the producer had temptations in his path,
especially under war conditions, to make inspection subservient to
rapidity of production. Sir Eric Geddes finally waived his objections.
He informed me that he based his arguments largely on his experience at
the Ministry of Munitions, with which he had been associated earlier in
the war. The contention of the naval officers at the Admiralty was that
even if the organization proposed was found to be workable for the Army,
it would not be satisfactory for the Navy, as in our case it was
essential that the responsibility