r duty imposed a very
heavy strain on officers and men, involving as it did the safe conduct
during the year of no fewer than one thousand ships carrying stores and
munitions for the Russian military forces.

_In the Baltic_ the situation became very difficult owing first to the
Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian debacle. Our force in
these waters consisted of seven submarines. It became evident at the
beginning of October, 1917, that the Germans were intending to carry out
some operations in the Baltic against Russia, and the question of
affording assistance was at once considered by the Naval Staff. It was
surmised that but little dependence could be placed on the Russian
Baltic Fleet (events showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order
to keep our control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of our
communications with France it was obvious that for any action we might
decide to take we should be obliged to divide the Grand Fleet, sending
such portion of that Command into the Baltic as could successfully
engage the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as well as to secure the
return passage via the Great Belt, and retaining a sufficient force to
deal with such German vessels as might attempt operations in the North
Sea or Channel during our raid into the Baltic.

There were many ways in which the Germans might seriously hamper, if not
entirely prevent, the return of our fleet from the Baltic unless we
secured the exits. The Great Belt could easily be closed by block-ships
at its narrowest points, and extensive minefields could be laid. It was
obvious, therefore, that to secure the exit a strong force would be
required, and that it would necessarily occupy a position where it would
be open to serious attack.

The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic via the Great
Belt, though not impossible, was difficult, involving as it did sweeping
passages through very extensive minefields, and even when our ships were
in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be necessary.

Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by the question of
fuel supply, especially to the destroyers and other small craft with a
limited radius of action, since we could not depend upon Russian sources
of supply. These were amongst the considerations which made it clear
that the operation was not one that I could recommend. The Russian naval
view is given in the following statement which appeared in the Russian
Pre