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Amongst vessels which were classed as auxiliaries the figures were:

Class of | July. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Deficit in
Vessel. | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | F | D | 5 months
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Minesweepers | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7
Trawlers |25 |18 |23 |14 |30 |13 |27 |28 |33 |24 | 41
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It will be seen from these figures that the forecast of June was
inaccurate even for the three succeeding months and that the total
deficit in the five months was considerable, except in the case of
T.B.D.'s and "P" boats.

The most disappointing figures were those relating to submarines,
trawlers and minesweepers. The case of the submarines may be put in
another way, thus:

In the June forecast twenty-six submarines were forecasted for delivery
during the period July to the end of December, the dates of three,
however, being somewhat uncertain; of this total of twenty-six, _only
nine were actually delivered_. Of the remainder, seven were shown in a
November forecast as delayed for four months, two for five months, and
one for nine months.

The attention of the Production Departments was continually directed to
the very serious effect which the delay was producing on our
anti-submarine measures, and the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was
informed of the difficult position which was arising. In the early part
of December I pointed out to the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty
Controller, Sir Allan Anderson, that it was obviously impossible for the
Naval Staff to frame future policy unless some dependence could be
placed on the forecast of deliveries. The Controller in reply stated
that accurate forecasts were most difficult, and proposed a discussion
with the Third Sea Lord and myself, but I had left the Admiralty before
the discussion took place.

The delays, as will be seen from the tables given, were most serious in
the case of vessels classed as auxiliaries. Sir Thomas Bell, who
possessed great experience of shipbuilding in a private capacity, was at
the head of the Department of the Deputy Controller for Dockyards and
Shipbuilding, and the Director of Warship Production was a distinguished
Naval constructor. The Deputy Controller of Auxiliary Shipbuilding was
an officer lent from the War Office, whose prev