nder the D.C.A.P.

In considering the whole question of production during the year 1917 it
should be borne in mind that very extensive orders were placed in the
early part of that year for guns, gun-mountings, mines, warships of the
smaller class and patrol craft, and that if we compare only the actual
output for 1917 with that of previous years without taking the above
fact into account, we might form an incorrect impression as to the
success of the organization for production. For instance, in the last
quarter of 1917, 1,515 guns of all calibres were delivered, as against
1,101 in the first quarter; in the month of November 1,335 mines of all
natures and 2,078 depth charges were filled, as compared with 625 mines
and 542 depth charges in July. These figures were the result of the
large orders placed early in the year, and it was not until 1918 that
the full fruits of the orders placed in 1917 became apparent. The
figures for that year, however, are not at my disposal.

One great advantage which resulted from the new organization, viz., the
creation of a Directorate of Materials and Priority, must be mentioned.
This Directorate controlled the distribution of all steel for all
services and produced a very beneficial effect on the issue of supplies
of steel to shipbuilders. The immense increase in staff which resulted
from the institution of the office of Admiralty Controller is exhibited
in the lists of staff in 1918 as compared with the staff in the early
part of 1917.

CHAPTER XI

NAVAL WORK

The main effort of the Navy during the year 1917 was directed towards
the defeat of the enemy's submarines, since the Central Powers confined
their naval effort almost entirely to this form of warfare, but many
other problems occupied our attention at the Admiralty, and some of
these may be mentioned.

Considerable discussion took place in the early part of the year on the
subject of the policy to be pursued in the Eastern theatre of war, and
naval opinion on the possibility of effecting a landing in force at
different points was invited and given. It need only be said here that
the matter was brought forward more than once, and that the situation
from the naval point of view was always clear. The feasible landing
places so far as we were concerned were unsuited to the military
strategy at that period; the time required to collect or build the great
number of lighters, horse boats, etc., for the strong force requir