in the North Sea. In
view of the fact, however, that the distance of the convoy routes from
the Horn Reef was only between 300 and 350 miles, and that on a winter
night this distance could almost be covered at a speed of 20 knots
during the fourteen or fifteen hours of darkness that prevailed, it will
be seen that unless the convoys were actually accompanied by a force
sufficient to protect them against operations by surface vessels, there
was undoubted risk of successful attack. It was not possible to forecast
the class of vessels by which such an attack might be carried out or the
strength of the attacking force. The German decision in this respect
would naturally be governed by the value of the objective and by the
risk to be run. Admiral Scheer in his book states that on one occasion,
in April, 1918, the German battle-cruisers, supported by the battleships
and the remainder of the High Sea Fleet, attempted such an attack, but
found no convoy. It was always realized by us that an attack in great
force might be made on the convoy, but such risk had to be accepted.

The movements of the ships of the Grand Fleet were a matter for the
Commander-in-Chief, provided always that no definite orders were issued
by the Admiralty or no warning of expected attack was given to the
Commander-in-Chief, and, prior to the first attack on the Scandinavian
convoy, no special force of cruisers or light cruisers accompanied the
convoy to guard it against attack by surface vessels, although a strong
deterrent to attack lay in the frequent presence of forces from the
Grand Fleet to the southward of the convoy routes, which forces would
seriously threaten the return of any raiding German vessels. As the
enemy would naturally make the northward passage by night we could
hardly expect to sight his ships on the outward trip.

The first attack took place at daylight on October 17. The convoy on
this occasion consisted of twelve ships, two British, one Belgian, one
Danish, five Norwegian and three Swedish, and was under the
anti-submarine escort of the destroyers _Mary Rose_ and _Strongbow_, and
two trawlers, the _Elsie_ and _P. Fannon_. At dawn, shortly after 6.0
A.M., two strange vessels were sighted to the southward, and were later
recognized as German light cruisers. They were challenged, but replied
by opening fire at about 6.15 A.M., disabling the _Strongbow_ with the
first salvo fired. The _Mary Rose_ steamed gallantly at the enemy with