view of
the attack of December 12, the question of the interval between convoys
was specially considered in its relation to the ability of the Grand
Fleet to furnish protection against surface attack. It was decided that
for this reason it would only be possible to sail convoys from Methil
every third day so as to avoid having two convoys at sea at a time, a
situation with which the Grand Fleet could not deal satisfactorily. The
organization then drawn up actually came into effect on January 20,
1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, and was continued with
certain modifications to the end of the war. The principal modification
was an increase of the interval between convoys, first, to four, and
later to five days in order to relieve the strain on the Grand Fleet
arising from the provision of covering forces; the disadvantage of the
resultant increased size of the convoys had to be accepted. Under the
new system the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland at Rosyth--Admiral
Sir Cecil Burney--became responsible for the control of the Scandinavian
convoys, the Admiralty selecting the routes.
The introduction of the convoy system for the Atlantic trade dates from
the early days of May, 1917, when the prospect--for it was only then a
prospect--of increasing assistance from the U.S. Navy in regard to
destroyers and other small craft for escort duty as well as convoy
cruisers for ocean work, made the system possible. Action taken with the
U.S. authorities for the introduction of a system by which the trade
from that country in neutral shipping was controlled enabled the ships
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron to be gradually withdrawn from blockade
duties and utilized as ocean convoy cruisers. Even with assistance from
the U.S. Navy in the shape of old battleships and cruisers, the use of
the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the withdrawal of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron of
five ships from the Grand Fleet, the use of the ships of the North
American and West Indies Squadron and of some of our older battleships
from the Mediterranean, there was still a shortage of convoy cruisers;
this deficiency was made up by arming a number of the faster cargo
vessels with 6-inch guns for duty as convoy cruisers. These vessels
usually carried cargo themselves, so that no great loss of tonnage was
involved.
On May 17 a committee was assembled at the Admiralty to draw up a
complete organization for a general convoy system. (The committee was
composed of th
|