t was not sustained, he
would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did
so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement
of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President's
being imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsible
place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not know
that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of
the people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr.
Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a
public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in
making and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it
was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the
capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against
the army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness,
but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not
have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after
Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war
between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of
whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,
Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker. There were others of
great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of those
first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the
Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded the
Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his
usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the
engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with
troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I
believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and
distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country
in front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage of
the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rank
to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans
with the