r present command
for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can
give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be
followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be
ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval
fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.
My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,
from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about
the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative
with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I
would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start
at the earliest possible moment.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."
Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his
movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below
Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.
Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.
By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring
Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we
did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or
James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower
route.
The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:
"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.
"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.
"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the e
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