et, as we take no precautions as to the future of these lands
with respect to the slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd.
I will not send up 'A' because he will do this, but I will leave the
country to 'B', who will do exactly the same [Major-General Gordon,
JOURNALS AT KHARTOUM.]

But if the justice of the decision is doubtful, its consequences were
obvious. Either the British Government were concerned with the Soudan,
or they were not. If they were not, then they had no reason or right to
prohibit the appointment of Zubehr. If they were, they were bound to see
that the garrisons were rescued. It was an open question whether Great
Britain was originally responsible for the safety of the garrisons.
General Gordon contended that we were bound to save them at all costs,
and he backed his belief with his life. Others may hold that Governments
have no right to lay, or at any rate must be very judicious in the
laying of burdens on the backs of their own countrymen in order that
they may indulge a refined sense of chivalry towards foreigners. England
had not misgoverned the Soudan, had not raised the revolt or planted the
garrisons. All that Egypt had a right to expect was commiseration. But
the moment Zubehr was prohibited the situation was changed. The refusal
to permit his employment was tantamount to an admission that affairs
in the Soudan involved the honour of England as well as the honour of
Egypt. When the British people--for this was not merely the act of the
Government--adopted a high moral attitude with regard to Zubehr,
they bound themselves to rescue the garrisons, peaceably if possible,
forcibly if necessary.

With their refusal to allow Zubehr to go to the Soudan began the long
and miserable disagreement between the Government and their envoy.
Puzzled and disturbed at the reception accorded to his first request,
Gordon cast about for other expedients. He had already stated that
Zubehr was 'the only chance.' But it is the duty of subordinates to
suggest other courses when those they recommend are rejected; and with
a whole-hearted enthusiasm and unreserved loyalty the General threw
himself into the affair and proposed plan after plan with apparent hope.

Gordon considered that he was personally pledged to effect the
evacuation of Khartoum by the garrison and civil servants. He
had appointed some of the inhabitants to positions of trust, thus
compromising them with the Mahdi. Others had undoubtedly been