ere signs of increased activity
in Omdurman itself. In these circumstances the British Government
determined to assist Italy by making a demonstration on the Wady Halfa
frontier. They turned to Egypt. It had always been recognised that the
recovery of the lost provinces was a natural and legitimate aspiration.
'The doubtful point was to decide the time when the military and
financial resources of the country were sufficiently developed to
justify an assumption of the offensive.' [LORD CROMER'S REPORTS: EGYPT,
No. 2, 1896.] From a purely Egyptian point of view the best possible
moment had not yet arrived. A few more years of recuperation were
needed. The country would fight the Soudan campaigns more easily if
first refreshed by the great reservoirs which were projected. For more
than two years both projects had been pressed upon the Government of
his Highness the Khedive--or, to write definitely, upon Lord Cromer. At
regular intervals Sir Herbert Kitchener and Sir William Garstin would
successively visit the British Agency (it would be treason to call it
'Government House')--the one to urge the case for a war, the other to
plead for a reservoir. The reservoir had won. Only a few weeks before
the advance to Dongola was ordered Garstin met Kitchener returning from
the Agency. The engineer inquired the result of the General's interview.
'I'm beaten,' said Kitchener abruptly; 'you've got your dam'--and
Garstin went on his way rejoicing.

The decision of the British Government came therefore as a complete
surprise to the Cairene authorities. The season of the year was
unfavourable to military operations. The hot weather was at hand. The
Nile was low. Lord Cromer's report, which had been published in the
early days of March, had in no way foreshadowed the event. The frontier
was tranquil. With the exception of a small raid on a village in the
Wady Halfa district and an insignificant incursion into the Tokar Delta
the Dervish forces had during the year maintained 'a strictly defensive
attitude.' [EGYPT, No. 1, 1896.] Lord Cromer, however, realised that
while the case for the reservoirs would always claim attention, the
re-conquest of the Soudan might not receive the support of a Liberal
Government. The increasing possibility of French intrigues upon the
Upper Nile had also to be considered. All politics are series of
compromises and bargains, and while the historian may easily mark what
would have been the best possible moment