f hostile and mutually repellent atoms? How they can even form
the necessary compact is difficult to understand, and the view seems
to clash with his own avowed purpose. It is Mill's aim, as it was
Bentham's, to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number;
and yet he seems to set out by proving as a 'law of human nature' that
nobody can desire the happiness of any one except himself. He quotes
from Montesquieu the saying, which shows an 'acute sense of this
important truth,' 'that every one who has power is led to abuse
it.'[91] Rather it would seem, according to Mill, all power implies
abuse in its very essence. The problem seems to be how to make
universal cohesion out of universal repulsion.

Mill has his remedy for this deeply seated evil. He attacks, as
Bentham had already done, the old-fashioned theory, according to which
the British Constitution was an admirable mixture of the three 'simple
forms.' Two of the powers, he argues, will always agree to 'swallow up
the third.'[92] 'The monarchy and aristocracy have all possible
motives for endeavouring to obtain unlimited power over the persons
and property of the community,' though the democracy, as he also says,
has every possible motive for preventing them. And in England, as he
no doubt meant his readers to understand, the monarchy and aristocracy
had to a great extent succeeded. Where, then, are we to look? To the
'grand discovery of modern times,' namely, the representative system.
If this does not solve all difficulties we shall be forced to the
conclusion that good government is impossible. Fortunately, however,
the representative system may be made perfectly effective. This
follows easily. It would, as he has said,[93] be a 'contradiction in
terms' to suppose that the community at large can 'have an interest
opposite to its interest,' In the Bentham formula, it can have 'no
sinister interest.' It cannot desire its own misery. Though the
community cannot act as a whole, it can act through representatives.
It is necessary to intrust power to a governing body; but that body
can be prevented by adequate checks from misusing its powers. Indeed,
the common theory of the British Constitution was precisely that the
House of Commons was 'the checking body.'[94] The whole problem is to
secure a body which shall effectively discharge the function thus
attributed in theory to the House of Commons. That will be done when
the body is chosen in such a way that its