iters conjured without
a very precise consideration of its true significance. By Bacon's
method we are to construct in time the 'noble science of politics,'
which is equally removed from the barren theories of Utilitarian
sophists and the petty craft of intriguing jobbers. The Utilitarians
are schoolmen, while the Whigs are the true followers of Bacon and
scientific induction. J. S. Mill admitted within certain limits the
relevancy of this criticism, and was led by the reflections which it
started to a theory of his own. Meanwhile, he observes that his father
ought to have justified himself by declaring that the book was not a
'scientific treatise on politics,' but an 'argument for parliamentary
reform.'[108] It is not quite easy to see how James Mill could have
made such a 'justification' and distinguished it from a recantation.

If Mill really meant what Macaulay took him to mean, it would be
superfluous to argue the question gravely. The reasoning is only fit,
like the reasoning of all Macaulay's antagonists, for the proverbial
schoolboy. Mill, according to Macaulay, proposes to discover what
governments are good; and, finding that experience gives no clear
answer, throws experience aside and appeals to absolute laws of human
nature. One such 'law' asserts that the strong will plunder the weak.
Therefore all governments except the representative must be
oppressive, and rule by sheer terror. Mill's very reason for relying
upon this argument is precisely that the facts contradict it. Some
despotisms work well, and some democracies ill; therefore we must
prove by logic that all despotisms are bad, and all democracies good.
Is this really Mill's case?

An answer given by Mill's champion, to which Macaulay replies in his
last article, suggests some explanation of Mill's position. Macaulay
had paid no attention to one highly important phrase. The terrible
consequences which Mill deduces from the selfishness of rulers will
follow, he says, 'if nothing checks.'[109] Supplying this
qualification, as implied throughout, we may give a better meaning to
Mill's argument. A simple observation of experience is insufficient.
The phenomena are too complex; governments of the most varying kinds
have shown the same faults; and governments of the same kind have
shown them in the most various degrees. Therefore the method which
Macaulay suggests is inapplicable. We should reason about government,
says Macaulay,[110] as Bacon told us to