f government is limited by another consideration. It has to
deal with one class of happiness, that is, with the pains and
pleasures 'which men derive from one another.' By a 'law of nature'
labour is requisite for procuring the means of happiness. Now, if
'nature' produced all that any man desired, there would be no need of
government, for there would be no conflict of interest. But, as the
material produced is finite, and can be appropriated by individuals,
it becomes necessary to insure to every man his proper share. What,
then, is a man's proper share? That which he himself produces; for, if
you give to one man more than the produce of his labour, you must take
away the produce of another man's labour. The greatest happiness,
therefore, is produced by 'assuring to every man the greatest possible
quantity of the produce of his own labour.' How can this be done?
Will not the strongest take the share of the weakest? He can be
prevented in one and apparently only in one way. Men must unite and
delegate to a few the power necessary for protecting all. 'This is
government.'[84]

The problem is now simple. Government is essentially an association
of men for the protection of property. It is a delegation of the
powers necessary for that purpose to the guardians, and 'all the
difficult questions of government relate to the means' of preventing
the guardians from themselves becoming plunderers.

How is this to be accomplished? The power of protection, says Mill,
following the old theory, may be intrusted to the whole community, to
a few, or to one; that is, we may have a democracy, an aristocracy, or
a monarchy. A democracy, or direct government of all by all, is for
the ordinary reasons pronounced impracticable. But the objections to
the other systems are conclusive. The need of government, he has
shown, depends upon 'the law of human nature'[85] that 'a man, if
able, will take from others anything which they have and he desires.'
The very principle which makes government necessary, therefore, will
prompt a government to defeat its own proper end. Mill's doctrine is
so far identical with the doctrine of Hobbes; men are naturally in a
state of war, and government implies a tacit contract by which men
confer upon a sovereign the power necessary for keeping the peace. But
here, though admitting the force of Hobbes's argument, he diverges
from its conclusion. If a democracy be impossible, and an aristocracy
or monarchy necessar