tch addressed to
General Hardy (upon whom the supreme command of the Humbert expedition
at first devolved) by Bruix, Minister of Marine, dated July 30, 1798.

"The executive Directory is busily engaged in arranging to send help to
the Irish who have taken up arms to sever the yoke of British rule. It
is for the French Government to second the efforts of a brave people who
have too long suffered under oppression."

In other words, the Directory regarded the achievement of her
independence by Ireland as an enterprise incidental to the greater
scheme of the conquest of England and of Europe.

It was further laid down in the despatch that "it is most important to
take every possible means to arouse the public spirit of the country,
and particularly to foster sedulously its hatred of the English name ...
There has never been an expedition whose result might more powerfully
affect the political situation in Europe, or could more advantageously
assist the Republic...."

Irish conspirators have never risen to play any part higher than the
office of cat's-paw to a foreign nation. To-day, they are content--at
present--to bribe with votes a political party in England. But it is
none the less essential to remember that, as in 1688 and as in 1798 a
great and militant foreign Power used the weapon of Irish sedition
against England, so in 1912 the same instrument lies ready to hand. For
the Home Rule conspiracy of to-day is nothing but the lees of the evil
heritage bequeathed by the French Revolution.

It is the business of the naval officer, who is not concerned with party
politics, to estimate the posture of international affairs solely in
relation to the security of the State. The condition of Ireland at this
moment, when the Home Rule issue has been wantonly revived, would, in
the event of a war occurring between Great Britain and a foreign Power,
involve the necessity of regarding Ireland as a strategic base of
essential value, a part of whose inhabitants might combine with the
hostile forces by giving them shelter and supplies, and even by inviting
them to occupy the country. Elsewhere in these pages, Lord Percy has
pointed out that the necessity of holding a disaffected Ireland by
garrisoning the country would totally disorganise our military
preparations for war--such as they are.

These considerations must materially affect strategical dispositions in
the event of war, involving the establishment and maintenance of a
s