on we want, a federal state._ If they were to do
as some of his unreflecting Home Rule friends, Irish and English,
have done, and demand that Ireland should not only have power to
lay taxes but to fix Customs and Excise then they had no State left
at all."

Another obvious objection to such a course is that it necessitates the
erection of a Customs barrier between Ireland and Great Britain. Tariff
Reformers are ready to admit that the present fiscal system is at least
as injurious to Ireland as to other portions of the United Kingdom. The
power to impose Customs duties on British goods--and the proportion of
British total imports is so large that if this power were limited to
foreign goods it would be financially valueless--would no doubt provide
the Irish Exchequer with considerable funds and might be used to develop
her prosperity. But the separation of the Customs systems for the
purpose of enabling Ireland to impose tariffs in her own interests would
necessarily be followed by a demand for treaty-making powers such as
have been successfully claimed and are now enjoyed by British Dominions
overseas. Under a general tariff for the United Kingdom the same
advantages would accrue to Ireland without any corresponding damage to
British or Imperial interests.

Thus, whether Customs and Excise are handed over to the Irish Parliament
or retained by the Imperial Parliament, the consequences are equally
embarrassing. In the one case Ireland would be deprived of the control
of some 60 per cent. of her present revenue, and of all power of
expansion; in the other, British trade with Ireland might be gravely
injured by hostile legislation, and the union of the three kingdoms in
financial and commercial policy would be destroyed. But this is not
federation, nor is it a step towards it. It is separation pure and
simple. Unless we are prepared to accept separation as the end of our
policy the control of Customs and therefore of Excise, must remain an
Imperial affair.

There can, therefore, be no justification for taking the control of the
Customs and Excise from the Imperial Parliament. The Irish Parliament
would thus be left with some 40 per cent. of present revenue under her
own control. But the power to raise further revenue within the limits
legally reserved to the Irish Parliament would be even less than this
figure would imply. For of the L4,100,000 of revenue other than Customs
and Excise, nearly L1,200,