full of
temptations for France and of menace for Germany. I cannot describe
our condition before the last war, and especially that of South
Germany, more strikingly than with the words of a thoughtful South
German sovereign. When Germany was urged to take the part of the
western powers in the oriental war, although her governments were not
convinced that this was in their interest, this sovereign--there is
no reason why I should not name him, it was the late King William of
Wuertemberg--said to me: "I share your view, that we have no call to
mix in this war, and that no German interests are at stake of
sufficient worth to spill a drop of German blood for them. But what
will happen if we should quarrel with the western powers on this
account? You may count on my vote in the Bundestag until war is at
hand. Then conditions will be altered. I am as ready as the next man
to fulfil my obligations. But take care lest you judge people
differently from what they are. Give us Strassburg, and we shall be
with you at all hazards. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an
ever armed force, I must fear that my country will be inundated by
foreign troops before the North German Alliance can come to my
assistance. Personally I shall not hesitate a moment to eat the hard
bread of exile in your camp, but my people, weighed down by
contributions, will write to me urging a change of policy upon me. I
do not know what I shall do, nor whether all will remain sufficiently
firm. The crux of the situation is Strassburg, for as long as it is
not German, it will prevent South Germany from giving herself
unreservedly to German unity and to a national German policy. As long
as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever ready army of from 100,000
to 150,000 men, Germany will find herself unable to appear on the
upper Rhine with an equally large army on time--the French will always
be here first."

I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says
everything. I need not add one word.

The wedge which Alsace pushed into Germany near Weissenburg separated
South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political
line of the Main. It needed a high degree of determination, national
enthusiasm, and devotion for our South German allies not to hesitate
one moment but to identify the danger of North Germany with their own
and to advance boldly in our company, in spite of that other danger in
their own immediate proximity to which a c