lever conduct of the war on
the part of France would have exposed them. That France in her
superior position had been ready to yield to the temptation, which
this advanced outpost of Strassburg offered her against Germany,
whenever her internal affairs made an excursion into foreign lands
desirable, we had seen for many decades. It is well known that the
French ambassador entered my office as late as August 6, 1866, with
the briefly worded ultimatum: "Either cede to France the city of
Mayence, or expect an immediate declaration of war." I was, of course,
not one moment in doubt about my reply. I said to him: "Well, then, it
is war." He proceeded with this reply to Paris. There they changed
their mind after a few days, and I was given to understand that this
instruction had been wrung from Emperor Napoleon during an attack of
illness. The further attempts on Luxembourg and the consequent issues
are known to you. I will not revert to them, nor do I believe that it
is necessary to prove that France did not always show a sufficiently
strong character to resist the temptations which the possession of
Alsace brought with it.

The question was, how to secure a guarantee against this. It had to be
of a territorial nature, because the guarantees of foreign powers were
not of much use to us, such guarantees having at times been subject to
supplementary and attenuating declarations. One might have thought
that all Europe would have felt the need of preventing the ever
recurring wars of two great and civilized peoples in the heart of
Europe, and that it would have been natural to assume that the
simplest way to do this was to strengthen the defences of that one of
the two participants who doubtless was the more pacific. I cannot,
however, say that at first this idea appeared convincing everywhere.
Other expedients were looked for, and the suggestion was often made
that we should be satisfied with an indemnity and the razing of the
French fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine. This I always opposed,
because I considered it an impracticable means of maintaining peace.
The establishment of an easement on foreign territory is very
oppressive and disagreeable to the sense of sovereignty and
independence of those who are affected by it. The cession of a
fortress is felt scarcely more bitterly than the injunction by
foreigners not to build on the territory which is under one's own
sovereignty. French passions have probably been excited more