xpensive." But the Russian policy, on the other
hand, cannot wish to substitute for this Turkish danger an
English-Austrian entanglement recurring every ten or twenty years. It
is, therefore, my opinion that Russia is equally interested with the
other powers in reaching an agreement now, and in not deferring it to
some future and perhaps less convenient time.

That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war to
sanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to be beyond
the realm of probability. If she could not obtain the sanction of the
other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, be
satisfied with the thought "_Beati possidentes_" (happy are the
possessors). Then the question would arise whether those who are
dissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and material
interests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to force
Russia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them. If they
should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could
bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when the
troops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after the
treaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are not
settled, and that another attempt will have to be made.

If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as the
aim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarian
strongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her position
which no doubt is threatening Constantinople--although she has given
no indication of a wish to occupy this city. Those who would have
accomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder the
responsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries of
European Turkey. That they should be willing simply to reinstate the
Turkish rule in its entirety after everything said and determined in
the conference, is, I believe, very improbable. They would, therefore,
be obliged to make some kind of a disposition, which could not differ
very much in principle from what is being proposed now. It might
differ in geographical extent and in the degree of independence, but I
do not believe that Austria-Hungary, for instance, the nearest
neighbor, would be ready to accept the entire heritage of the present
Russian conquest, and be responsible for the future of these Slavic
countries, either by incorporating them in the state of Hungary or
establishing th